

Study Conducted for Nepal Peace Trust Fund, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction  
Final Report

Perception Survey  
of  
the Stakeholders  
of  
Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF)



*interdisciplinary analysts*

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IDA's flagship activity has been concentrated on introducing and further developing quantitative social science in Nepal. To this end since 2004 it has been conducting nation-wide scientific surveys on politics, armed violence, safety and security, business climate etc. which together have generated a rich quantitative data base of mass public opinion in Nepal over a considerable period of time. We are grateful to GIZ-NPTF for providing us the opportunity to extend our study zone into this realm of peace-building through the use of different sets of social science methodology.

The study was conducted by an IDA team led by Dr. Sudhindra Sharma (sociologist and IDA Executive Director), which consisted of Mr. Chiranjibi Bhandari, Mr. Rajib Timilsina, Mr. Bijaya Pant, Mr. Pranab Kharel, Mr. Arjun Bahadur B.K., Mr. Shashwat Acharya, Ms. Shuvechha Ghimire, Mr. Ratna Dahal, Ms. Deelasha Rayamajhi, while Mr. Dipak Gyawali (IDA Chair) served as advisor. Chandra K.C and Pranay Sthapit were involved in processing the quantitative data. Although it goes without saying, IDA wishes to explicitly state that in no manner should any weakness in the report be attributed to NPTF-GIZ, its professionals or our interviewees. The views, interpretations, impressions and opinions summarized in this study are those of and by the IDA study team alone.

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### Contact:

*Interdisciplinary Analysts* (IDA), Sri Durbar Tole, Patan Dhoka, Lalitpur, GPO Box 3971, Kathmandu, Nepal.  
Tel: +977 1 55281111. Email: [info@ida.com.np](mailto:info@ida.com.np)

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# Perception Survey of the Stakeholders of Nepal Peace Trust Fund

## 1. Background and Introduction

It was with the aim of resolving the ten year conflict between the Nepali state and Maoist insurgents that the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed between the concerned parties in November 2006. Various initiatives and processes have helped in consolidating the peace process and in meeting the requirements of the CPA once the accord was signed. The establishment of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) was one such significant milestone. The setting up of Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) in January 2007 with the mandate to implement the provisions of the CPA and subsequent related agreements was another such milestone.

Since its establishment, NPTF has become the principal body to coordinate between the Government of Nepal and other donor agencies for addressing the necessities of post-conflict peace-building. MoPR is the core ministry responsible for the overall operation of NPTF, and the Minister and the Secretary of MoPR chair the Board and the Technical Committee (TC) of NPTF respectively.

Programme documents of NPTF (2010) clearly state that its main objectives are to function as a coordinating body for peace related initiatives, act as a funding mechanism for GoN-Donor resources, and monitor the peace process<sup>1</sup>. NPTF is currently in its second phase, having completed its first phase between January 2010 and January 2013.

Although it has primarily been the Nepali political actors and the decisions they have taken that have mainly been responsible for driving Nepal's peace process, NPTF has played an important facilitating role (in Nepali "sahajkarta ko bhumika") and as a platform for policy dialogue between GoN and the donors. The monitoring framework within NPTF has generally been good as attested by regular progress reports, government-donor joint monitoring, external monitoring and joint review reports. Moreover, annual perception surveys undertaken since 2010 as well as internal and external monitoring also portray a generally favorable picture of NPTF.

As NPTF moves into the third phase and begins to work on the strategy for the third phase, it has become necessary to assess what it has accomplished in the past, its current status as well as the priorities, themes and modalities for the next phase. The very successes of the first two phases themselves have given rise to a new context and new alignment of perceptions between the key

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<sup>1</sup> Based on the sixth Four-monthly progress report published by Peace Fund Secretariat, NPTF, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) published on 30 June 2009.

stakeholders; and this has added to the necessity of this review. The changing perceptions of the various stakeholders could provide insights into those dimensions.

## **2. Objectives**

The broad objective of this study is to ascertain the perceptions of the stakeholders of NPTF and more specifically to:

- Identify the perceptions of different stakeholders regarding the priority areas of CPA and related peace agreements' implementation at this juncture and in the foreseeable future
- Document the views of stakeholders on how this could be translated into the formulation of the NPTF strategic priorities
- Identify the views of stakeholders on what sorts of programs and projects of NPTF may capture the spirit of the CPA in a better way
- Get the opinions of the stakeholders regarding the closure, extension or transformation of NPTF by 2016.

## **3. Approach and Method**

In order to identify views and opinions of the various stakeholders, a perception survey was undertaken wherein most of the questions were closed ended, pre-coded type and some were open ended. The survey questionnaire was formulated by the NPTF with the GIZ team at NPTF taking the initiative, while it was administered to the various stakeholders by Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA), the research organization that was given this consulting assignment.

The questionnaire covered the following themes:

- Perceptions of NPTF performance
- Opinions on priorities of CPA implementation at this juncture and in the foreseeable future
- Opinions on continuation versus discontinuation of NPTF (reasons, value-added, comparative advantage)
- Opinions on continuation scenarios and options
  - Roles to be played and thematic priorities
  - Extension as it is versus transformation
  - Implementing actors.

In order to facilitate the interview, where respondents so desired, the Nepali translated version of the questionnaire was administered. The survey was administered to the various stakeholders of

NPTF between March 2 and April 1, 2014. A total of 81 stakeholders were willing to be interviewed. The categorization of these stakeholders is shown below:

**Table 1: Total number of interviews according to the categories of respondents**

S/N	Categories	Number of interviews undertaken
1	MOPR Including LPC Secretaries	10
2	IAs of NPTF	12
3	Former Chief Secretaries, Secretaries of MOPR, and PFS Directors	7
4	Former Minister and Board of NPTF	5
5	Senior Civil Servant	8
6	Media and Journalist	4
7	Donors Contributing to NPTF	8
8	Politicians, two from five major political parties each	8
9	Other International Actors	8
10	Civil Societies	11
	<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>

### 3.1 Data Processing and Analysis

Data from the closed-ended, pre-coded sections of the questionnaire was processed and analyzed using the software programmes CPro and MS Excel. A data entry programme was first created using the CPro software. In order to maintain the data clean, legal codes, authorized range check, consistency check and extreme case check systems were developed in the data entry programme. After the completion of the data entry, the data was imported in MS Excel. The necessary charts, graphs and tables were produced in MS Excel.

Data from the open-ended questions were also processed. This entailed transcribing the interviews and then translating these into English. English transcripts of each of the interviews were prepared and information was then synthesized and distilled. This synthesized information from the open-ended portions of the survey has been inserted into the relevant sections of the report.

In this way while the closed ended pre-coded sections presents a good account of “what” i.e., what is the proportion of respondents who have a particular view, the open-ended section provides insights into “why” i.e., why do the respondents think the way they do. The open-ended sections complement the findings of the closed-ended, pre-coded sections.

### 3.2 Timeline


The contract was signed between GIZ–NPTF and IDA on February 24, 2014. The next few days was devoted to finalizing the names of the possible respondents, seeking appointment with them and translating the questionnaire into Nepali. The actual administration of the survey commenced from March 2, 2014 onwards. The interviews were undertaken up to April 1, 2014.

## 4. Survey Findings

### 4.1 Respondent categories

The perception survey was conducted among 81 individuals. Of these 81 individuals 15 percent constituted of Implementing Agencies of NPTF, 14 percent constituted of Civil Society members, and 12 percent constituted of Officials from MoPR. 'Donors contributing to NPTF', Politicians, and 'senior servants from other government organizations', and 'other international actors involved in peace process' all constituted 10 percent of total population. This was followed by the category 'Former Secretary of MoPR or former PFS Director' (9 percent), 'Former Ministers of MoPR or former Board Members' (6 percent) and Journalists (5 percent). The detail of the category of respondents is provided in Table 2.


Chart 1: Respondent categories in percentage figures (Base 81)



#### *4.2 Priorities of CPA implementation at this juncture and in the foreseeable future*

The respondents were asked about the priorities of the peace process in general today and in the near future. They were informed that since the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed in 2006 some objectives have been achieved, while other tasks remained to be done. The specific tasks mentioned in the CPA and other agreements were read out to them one by one and respondents were asked which among these should be prioritized for today and the years to come. Tasks mentioned by a high proportion of people, which should remain a priority, were: transitional justice (99 percent), constitution making and support to conflict affected persons and communities (91 percent), and local and national level elections (90 percent). With the exception of re-integration of combatants, among the various tasks that were read out, respondents generally thought that these should be a priority.

Chart 2: Priorities of the CPA Implementation (Base = 81)



While the above mentioned tasks were specified in the questionnaire, the questionnaire also had space for respondents to state other tasks they deem important for the peace process. All 81 respondents were further asked if they have any other tasks in mind that they think are important

for the peace process. Several of the respondents mentioned such tasks. The many tasks that were mentioned by the respondents were collapsed into eight broad categories.

The structured questionnaire allowed respondents to specify if they thought there were other priorities important for the CPA implementation. Quantifying the response, the highest proportion in the “Others” category was registered by “reconstruction”, which was mentioned by 10 respondents. Five respondents identified “Capacity building<sup>2</sup>” as a task that needs to be prioritized. “Reconciliation”, “Justice and Security”, “Peace education”, and “coordination among various stakeholders” are other tasks that needs to be prioritized in the implementation of CPA, which were mentioned by 4 respondents each. Likewise, 2 respondents prioritized “peace monitoring” and 1 respondent prioritized “strengthening democracy” as tasks important in CPA implementation.

**Table 2: Priorities of the CPA Implementation - Others**

Others (Priorities of the CPA Implementation)	Total number of respondents
Reconstruction	10
Capacity building	5
Reconciliation	4
Justice and Security	4
Peace Education	4
Co-ordination	4
Peace monitoring	2
Strengthening Democracy	1
Total	34

The absence of the mention of reconstruction as an important task associated with the CPA that needs to be prioritized, in the closed-ended pre-coded section could be misleading. (It needs to be

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<sup>2</sup> In addition to these five respondents who were explicit on this issue, several other respondents also mentioned during the open-ended discussions after the formal questionnaires were administered that the NPTF was the only formal mechanism within the government apparatus that had acquired some capacity and track record on peace building. This, they felt, needed to be preserved and built upon for early identification and thwarting of potential conflict hotspots in the future.

born in mind that this had not been specified as a task in the questionnaire). Many of the stakeholders either in open-ended session or after the formal interview had been completed, pointed this out and mentioned the need for prioritizing reconstruction or more specifically the reconstruction of police posts and other buildings that had been destroyed during the conflict.<sup>3</sup>

In discussions with the respondents in a more free-wheeling format (often after the quantitative questionnaire was administered), some insights were offered. The peace process has not been completed since the TRC has not been formed, the CoDP issues have not been tackled and state restructuring to solve grievances that led to the conflict is yet to be addressed. Important post-conflict tasks that still need to be focused on are local reconciliation programs through more Track 3 (grassroots up) activities in addition to the Track 1 (government department and agencies led) activities. Many felt that NPTF is still needed and the donors and the government still need to work together. It helped end the decade long conflict but critical post conflict peace building tasks such as transitional justice, care and compensation of conflict victims, relief package distribution to conflict-affected people from both state and rebel sides, etc. are still in embryonic stage. These are the issues that re-emerge again in subsequent sections.

### **4.3 Annual Perception Survey of NPTF**


#### **4.3.1 Knowledge of NPTF**

All the respondents were asked to self-assess their knowledge of NPTF. The answer that was mentioned by the highest proportion was 'good' (mentioned by 43 percent), followed by 'fair' (mentioned by 25 percent). Additionally, 16 percent mentioned that their knowledge of NPTF was very good, while response constituting weak and very weak adds up to another 16 percent.

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<sup>3</sup> 'Reconstruction' tends to have dual meaning. When asked in English, the term was easily visualized as physical reconstruction. In Nepali, our surveyors administering the questionnaires used the word 'punarnirman' but sometimes respondents during discussions also reverted to 'punarsanrachana', the latter having more of a flavor of 'restructuring' or 'reconciliation'. The psychological re-building of damaged feelings and mindsets is implied in this other meaning of 'reconstruction'. A pointed example given by a respondent was the reconstruction of Palpa Durbar: unless re-built, children were bound to ask why these ruins existed in the middle of the city, and elders would very uncomfortably have to answer that it was the result of Maoist bombing, thus re-opening the scars of war and preventing closure.

Chart 3: Knowledge of NPTF (Base= 81)




#### 4.3.2 Perceptions of NPTF performance

The section on perceptions of NPTF performance was further divided into three sections which attempted to gauge understanding of NPTF, NPTF’s performance to administer professionally, and NPTF’s contributions to the peace process.

The first question about the understanding of the NPTF could be regarded as a continuation of question 3. Supplementing the general finding of question 3, with regards to the question of respondent’s knowledge/understanding of NPTF’s rationale, objectives, decision-making structures, total budget and its contributors, criteria for supporting projects and results achieved by NPTF, the most frequently mentioned response is ‘good’ followed by ‘fair’. While more people are generally more aware of understanding of Rationale of NPTF, they tend to be less so of NPTF’s total budget and its contributors.


Chart 4: Understanding of NPTF (Base= 81)



#### 4.3.3 NPTF performance to administer professionally


The survey endeavored to ascertain respondent’s knowledge of NPTF performance to administer professionally by asking a “bus-stop” question, a method of gauging deeply held views through instant response. The respondent was asked to imagine standing in a bus stop, and a friend comes by and in passing asks casually, “How is the NPTF doing?” In response, the highest proportion of respondents said that NPTF is doing well (43 percent) followed by those who said ‘fairly’ (41 percent), followed by those who said ‘poorly’ (9 percent).

Chart 5: NPTF performance to administer professionally: How is the NPTF doing? (Base= 81)



The respondents were also asked if they have observed any changes in the NPTF during the past one year. Some 60 percent think it has marginally improved, while 16 percent say they have observed no change.

Chart 6: What level of change do you observe in NPTF during the last one year? (Base= 81)



Certain statements about the NPTF were read out and respondents were asked to rate their support to these statements in a scale of 1 and 10, where 1 indicated low support and 10 indicated high support. In general, all of the statements received ratings above 5 which is the average level of support. The statement to receive the highest rating was “NPTF has a clear definition of its rationale, mission and purpose” (7.0) and the statements to receive the lowest rating (which,

however is still high) were “NPTF managing its funds effectively and transparently” (5.8), “NPTF monitors and implementation of its project timely and professionally” (5.8), and “NPTF assesses results/achievements and impacts effectively” (5.8).

**Table 3: Support to statements in a scale of 1 to 10 (Base= 81)**


	All	
	Count	Mean
4.2c The NPTF has a clear definition of its rationale, mission and purpose	81	7.0
4.2d The NPTF has established appropriate decision making structures	75	6.7
4.2e The NPTF provides clear and reasonable criteria for its support to projects	79	6.2
4.2f The NPTF is appropriately collaborating with implementing agencies	76	6.0
4.2g The NPTF is managing its funds efficiently and transparently	74	5.8
4.2h The NPTF monitors implementation of its projects timely and professionally	69	5.8
4.2i The NPTF assesses results / achievements and impacts effectively	69	5.8
4.2j The NPTF is providing audits timely and professionally	57	6.6
4.2k The NPTF is providing reports timely and professionally	65	6.5
4.2l The NPTF communicates appropriately with its stakeholders	77	6.3
4.2m The NPTF is learning from its own experiences	73	6.5

**4.3.4 NPTF’s contribution to the peace process**

To ascertain NPTF’s contribution to the peace process, several statements indicative of the areas in which NPTF has worked in, was read out and respondents were asked to specify NPTF’s role in those areas. The areas where NPTF’s contribution was seen to be substantial (including decisive) were improving the living conditions of the cantonments, supporting the successful conduct of elections, and strengthening peace initiatives at the local and national levels.

This turned out to be a tricky question to those who were not more directly ‘hands-on’ involved with the NPTF. It was clear that many respondents were viewing NPTF and MoPR synonymously; and while answering the questions regarding the peace process, they were reacting as such. Another matter of perception actually held by the respondents was that they understood many of the activities undertaken as done by other government agencies such as the Department of Roads, MoPR, MoHA etc. and not by the NPTF per se. Hence there is the need to interpret these survey claims with a degree of caution.


Chart 7: The NPTF has managed to contribute to the peace process by way of..... (Base= 81)



4.3.5 To even better contribute to the peace process

To gauge the perception of respondents, certain statements were read out and respondents were asked if addressing these would even better contribute to the peace process. The issues that received the top priority were “better involvement of all parties to the conflict in the decision making process” and “improving provision of information to the general public” (48 percent said it should be a top priority), “improving coordination with other peace relevant institutions/ initiatives” (46 percent), and “monitoring the peace process of Nepal” (38 percent)

Chart 8: To even better contribute to the peace process.... (Base = 81)



#### 4.4 Perceptions on the future of NPTF

##### 4.4.1 Continuation vs. discontinuation of NPTF

NPTF is presently mandated until January, 2016. Respondents were asked if NPTF as an instrument will be needed after January 2016 or if it could be closed down. Majority of the respondents (78 percent) thought NPTF as an instrument will still be needed after January 2016.

Chart 9: If NPTF will still be needed after January 2016 (Base= 81)





Chart 10: If NPTF will still be needed after January 2016 by categories (Base= 81)




Of the 14 percent who think it should be closed down, this response is marked among the former Secretaries of MoPR or former PFS Directors, Politicians and Other International Actors. However, even among these categories of respondents, this is a minority view. Interestingly, a high proportion of journalists are ambivalent.

There is a general sense that the peace process has not been completed and hence some relevance of the NPTF and the MoPR is still there – the TRC has not been formed, the CoDP issues have not been tackled and state restructuring to solve grievances that led to the conflict is yet to be addressed through proper constitution making. However, the political evolution that has taken

place since the signing of the CPA as well as the parliamentary exercises of the past five years indicate that some change in direction, mandate and mechanism are felt to be needed.

A follow-up question “For how many years do you think it should continue?” was asked to the 78 percent of the total respondents who answered ‘Yes’ in the earlier question.


Chart 11: For how many years do you think it should continue? (Base= 63)



Of 78 percent of respondents who feels NPTF will be still needed after January, 2016, 57 percent said that it should be continued for less than 5 years whereas 43 percent of the respondents feel it should be continued for more than 5 years. It needs to be born in mind that this is a filtered question that has been asked only to those who think NPTF is still needed. The response that it should continue for more than 5 years is concentrated among MoPR officials.

In the open discussions, the views that emerged for most was that NPTF should be extended under the following stringent conditions: to complete the remaining tasks; and even among those tasks, to peace-specific tasks rather than tasks in sectors that are better handled by other programs and departments. For those who favoured extending NPTF beyond five years, the view was that NPTF should be transformed into a body working in the field of predicting (i.e. monitoring potential hotspots) and thus preempting or preventing future conflicts.

Chart 12: For how many years do you think it should continue by categories (Base= 63)




4.4.2 Continuation scenarios and options

4.4.2.1 Role to be played and thematic priorities

Respondents were asked to consider various options of thematic priorities within the possibilities of simple extension as is now or doing so with changes in its priorities, implementing arrangements, organizational form and institutional affiliation.

The issues that were identified to be a priority of NPTF were support to conflict affected persons and communities (75 percent), transitional justice (74 percent), and constructive and sustained local capacities for peace (63 percent).

Chart 13: Role to be played and thematic priorities (Base = 81)



While the above mentioned tasks were specified in the questionnaire, the questionnaire also had space for respondents to state other tasks they deem important for NPTF priority and theme. All 81 respondents were further asked if they have any other tasks in mind that they think are important as NPTF priority and as NPTF theme. Several of the respondents mentioned such tasks and the various tasks mentioned were collapsed into six broad categories.

Respondents were further asked if there are any other important roles to be played by NPTF that are not mentioned in options. Quantifying the data among the 81 respondents, in addition to the list specified above, some 6 respondents mentioned that “coordination among various stakeholders” needs to be a NPTF priority, 5 respondents mentioned “reconciliation”, 4 respondent each mentioned “reconstruction” and “peace education”. Additionally, 3 respondents identified “peace monitoring” as NPTF priority, while 1 respondent said “justice and security”.

**Table 4: Role to be played and thematic priorities – Other**

<b>Others (Role to be played and thematic priorities)</b>	<b>Total number of respondents</b>
Coordination	6
Reconciliation	5
Reconstruction	4
Peace Education	4
Peace Monitoring	3
Justice and Security	1
Total	34

In more free-wheeling frank discussions after the formal interview, government officials (either with MoPR or with other ministries), politicians as well as journalists were of the opinion that reconstruction of infrastructure rather than the software aspects such as advocacy, training etc. should be the priority where funds should be targeted, which would be money better spent. They had serious qualms about donor involvement in the software issues in the past, something that is elaborated in the discussions below on the role of NGAs. The thematic priorities that respondents homed in on included:


- a) Support to Truth and Reconciliation Committee and Commission on Disappeared Persons
- b) Finalize real victims based on still who needs supports, provide them sufficient relief package within a deadline bringing the issue to a closure
- c) Focus more on reconstruction of physical infrastructures (Almost all respondent admired the involvement of the NPTF in reconstructing police units in different parts of the country)

Apart from these, respondents highlighted reconstruction, capacity development of local bodies, and support to peace structure melding into the permanent structure of government, as NPTF priorities. Reconstruction was seen as one of most important task of peace process for NPTF because reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure is not possible through the regular budget of the government.

4.4.2.2 Extension as it is versus transformation


The survey endeavored to explore stakeholder’s preference about NPTF extension – whether it should be extended as it is or whether it should be transformed. Majority of the respondents (73 percent) were of the opinion that NPTF should not be extended as it is.

Chart 14: NPTF extended as it is (Base= 81)



The idea that NPTF should not be extended as it is – the majority opinion – remains very high among donors contributing to NPTF, other international actors involved in peace building and among senior civil servants from other government organizations. The idea that NPTF should be extended as it is remains a minority view but interestingly, a majority of civil society members espouse this view. For instance some of the individuals associated with movements said that the past agreements had been with MoPR/NPTF and they wanted a continuation of this setup. Without the MoPR/NPTF, they believed any other setup could lead the state to renege on its commitments or even bureaucratically dilute them.

Chart 15: NPTF extended as it is by categories (Base= 81)



#### 4.4.2.3 Mandate change

A follow-up question “The mandate should be changed?” was asked to those respondents who answered ‘No’ to the earlier question (i.e., 73 percent). Among these, 78 percent were of the explicit opinion that the mandate of NPTF should be changed.

Chart 16: The mandate should be changed? (Base= 59)





Chart 17: The mandate should be changed by categories (Base= 59)



Those who think its mandate should be changed are highest among Donors contributing to NPTF and civil society members.

#### 4.4.2.4 NPTF affiliation

As to whether it should be with MoPR or with another organization different from MoPR, some 46 percent think it should be with another organization and 54 percent think it should be with MoPR.

Chart 18: It should be affiliated to an organization different from MoPR (Base= 59)





Chart 19: It should be affiliated to an organization different from ... by categories (Base= 59)



Though the aggregate shows that the response is 47 percent for affiliation to organization other than MoPR and 53 percent for continuing with MoPR, the disaggregation by categories shows a variegated response. On one hand, donors contributing to NPTF and other international actors involved in peace process want NPTF to be affiliated to an organization different from MoPR. On the other hand, Former Ministers of MoPR and politicians do not believe that it should be affiliated to an organization different from MoPR.

The open-ended interviews indicated that donors thought MoPR to be a weak ministry (discussed further below in 4.4.2.6); the preference was for this ministry to be directly under the Prime Minister.

4.4.2.5 Transformation

Another follow-up question was whether it should be transformed into a new organization. A majority were of the opinion that it should not be transformed into a new organization (69 percent). Those who argued it should be transformed were 31 percent.

Chart 20: It should be transformed into a new organization (Base= 59)





Chart 21: It should be transformed into a new organization by categories (Base= 59)



#### 4.4.2.6 Any other changes

The final question in the series was “Are there any other important changes that need to take place if NPTF is extended?” Some 64 percent replied in the affirmative.

Chart 22: Any other changes that need to take place if NPTF is extended? (Base= 59)





Chart 23: Any other changes that need to take place if NPTF is extended by categories (Base= 59)



This view (that other changes need to take place if NPTF is extended) is strongest among civil society members and least so among senior civil servants from other government organizations.

Interesting insights could be gleaned while examining more closely the open-ended sections of the questions on NPTF being extended as it is; the question of whether its mandate should be changed; the question of whether it should be affiliated to organization different from MoPR; or whether it should be transformed into a new organization.

The reason most of the stakeholders think that NPTF should not be extended as it is, is due to the understanding that NPTF has completed many of the tasks assigned to it and so should not continue as it is. There is also a perception that its placement within MoPR has made it less effective and that NPTF could be more effective if placed within a stronger ministry such as OPMCM, MOFALD or MoHA. (Discussed further in Annex 4)

More open discussions after the interview revealed additional insights, but their interpretation should be done with a touch of caution since, as mentioned previously, many of the respondents perceive NPTF and MoPR interchangeably. Majority of the respondents view the need for NPTF transformation and then its extension rather than its extension as it is. The idea is to narrow down the mandate by concentrating on tasks that remain unachieved or incomplete (such as Truth and Reconciliation, support to conflict affected persons, reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, etc.) and set the priorities and mandate of the NPTF accordingly. Other tasks could be dealt by the permanent structure of government agencies. Cluster 1 needed to be excluded as it has been completed.

Respondents were also of the view that the types of projects that could be supported within the framework of the CPA and what role MoPR should play in coordination and monitoring should be more specifically defined. If the MoPR is unable to play this role, then projects should not be supported, since it is likely that much efficiency would be lost with the lack of coordination as well as planning and duplication in execution.

While some of the immediate issues of the peace process were addressed, many of the post conflict issues are yet to be addressed, especially given that new ones continue to emerge in the over changing political dynamics. Therefore, 3<sup>rd</sup> phase programs should be carried out reviewing past performances and focusing on the emerging issues.

By disaggregating categories, it is seen that civil society in general feels that MoPR is not effective while political parties feel that, with the completion of the core tasks, the remaining should go to proper units of normal government functions. An interesting insight as to why MoPR in general and NPTF in particular were not perceived as being effective was the issue of rank of the chief executives therein within the government structure (joint secretary rather than full secretary, parallel turf issues with MoF and National Planning Commission etc.) The agencies mentioned as having more clout and thus more effective for carrying out some of the functions of the NPTF were Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, and Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development. It was also felt that, because the MoPR does not have any sustainable structure at the local level and thus cannot coordinate with other line agencies at the local level, its effectiveness in the past was not as much as it should have been.

Another element of grievance was that even though the government put in a greater share of the budget into the NPTF than all the donors, its voice was less heard and its role there was not as “dignified”. The political party representatives also voiced the feeling that they were often treated there as “passive witnesses” (in Nepali “sakshi kinara ma basne”) when it came to approving programs based on thick reports they were not given sufficient time to digest.

It was also felt by many that a wholly new organization per se is not necessary, but NPTF should be more effective with its mandate made specific and focused. As for any other changes needed, majority of the responses was that other changes were not needed but that priorities should be set.

#### 4.4.2.7 Opening up to NGA

The survey also sought to learn more about the implementation being opened up to NGAs if NPTF was to continue into the future. There was quite a strong division: a majority of the respondents were of the opinion that NPTF should be opened to NGAs (52 percent), while 41 percent were pretty emphatic that it should not be opened up to NGAs.

Chart 24: Project implementation be opened up to NGAs, too? (Base= 81)





Chart 25: Project implementation be opened up to NGAs too by categories (Base= 81)



Although the response that project implementation should be opened to NGAs registers 52 percent as a whole, by disaggregated categories it is opposed by politicians, journalists and senior civil servants from other government organizations. It received strong support among civil society members, other international actors involved in peace building and donors contributing to NPTF.

There was strong divergence and polarization of views regarding the role of non-governmental organizations and civil society actors in the peace process as well as implementation activities. The view from most of the donors and civil society was that they were a key set of players in the peace process and the changes that have come about in the country in these last years, that they had a better set of links with conflicting parties and capacity to mediate which the government does not have; thus their role and capacity should be recognized and made use of. The view from political parties and government functionaries was that Nepali civil society is highly partisan, fractious along ideological lines, is not transparently accountable as are government officials or elected representatives, and can lead to international interference and misuse of funds. They could be watch-dogs but should not be the implementing arms.

Among the stakeholders who were of the opinion that project implementation should not be opened to NGAs, the reasoning is:

- NGAs are not properly accountable to government, and there are serious problems of transparency with their functioning.
- Not all NGAs have transparent, home-grown and with grassroots-based agenda but are quite often carriers of imported fads.
- NPTF should decide based on its priorities in consultation with political leaders and other relevant units of government and not open the whole process to possible interminable delays.
- NGO should not be IAs but should remain as ‘watch dogs’
- NGAs have access to many other sources of funding: the funding from this pool is for specific purposes of high-level state efforts at peace building that should not be diverted to non-state actors.

Among the stakeholders who are of the opinion that project implementation should in fact be opened to NGAs, the reasoning is:

- Government alone does not have capacity or the reach into conflict affected communities that NGAs have.
- NGAs and civil society have been critical elements of the peace process and thus they do have some right to stake a claim to participate in the NPTF program and processes.
- NGAs often function as ‘social auditors’ or critics and keeping them out of the process may be counterproductive since it may only end up raising the decibel level of their critical voices to levels of high discomfort.

## 5. IDA’s Inferences and Indicants

This perception survey has been, for IDA and many of its team members, a continuation of their previous research engagement with NPTF in the vertical monitoring process. With IDA’s decade long involvement with quantitative as well as qualitative surveys throughout Nepal across a range of areas from conflict and politics to development and changing mores, we use some of that experience to provide, in this concluding section, an additional searchlight into the difficult ‘why’ and ‘what then’ questions behind the conflicting perceptions described above.

Subsequent to administering the formal questionnaires, many of the interviewees engaged in discussions with our team members that provided new or additional insights into why they felt the way they did. They also shared some reservations that they had, which in their opinion the framing of the questions did not quite do justice to. Many had responded ‘yes’ or ‘no’ with great difficulty as their experience and awareness of the vast grey area that lay in-between militated against such simplifications. This section summarizes some of those uncomfortable insights and reservations.

One set of interviewees felt that the NPTF had been doing its job quite well in very adverse circumstances and hence it needed to be left as it is and not tampered with so that the remaining and incomplete tasks can be finished. Within this set, the argument was also that this body has performed quite well in the past and has acquired significant managerial capacity that needs to be preserved, improved upon and better utilized in the future.

On the other hand, there were also views that the NPTF has fulfilled most of its originally set mandate and that, under changed circumstances, if it is to be retained, the mandate should be concentrated on tasks outlined in the CPA that had not been fulfilled or remained under achieved. Tasks specified in the CPA which remain unfulfilled were transitional justice i.e., truth and reconciliation bill, support to genuine conflict affected persons and communities (in contrast to the current situation where those who have not been affected by the conflict have been benefitted), and local and national level elections, and constitution drafting process.

A majority preferred extending the NPTF after transforming it – not extending it as it is (which needs to be understood as NPTF concentrating on CPA tasks that remain unfulfilled or under achieved). Likewise a majority agree that its mandate needs to be changed. However, there remains a difference of opinion on whether it should be extended for less than 5 years or for more than 5 years. Likewise, there is a difference of opinion on whether it should continue to be within MoPR or in a different organizational set up. A majority, however, thinks NPTF should not be transformed into a completely new organization. Finally there is a difference of opinion regarding the involvement of the NGA in the implementation process.

*Taking these responses together one could say that the majority preference is for the continuation of NPTF with a more clearly articulated mandate and focused program to be carried out through a more effective organizational set up.*

Another issue that was raised was the relationship between contribution and voice in the decision making process. Given that NPTF is a platform for policy dialogue among donors and the Nepali government, respondents called for the role of GoN and donors in the NPTF needing to be commensurate with their contributions to the fund (with whichever party contributing more, having more say in the setting up of priorities and modalities). A more effective role for the political parties in the decision making processes was also called for.

Though the majority opinion was that the Cluster I activities had been completed, there continued to be a degree of apprehension about the possibilities of the ex-combatants to puncture peace. Depending upon which end of the political spectrum one talked to, the lines of argument seemed to be:

- There should be no further support as far too much has already been done since the signing of the CPA (and much has been squandered away). This could be characterized as the dominant opinion.
- There continues to be disgruntlement among the ranks of ex-combatants, especially those deemed unqualified, and given that they are young, frustrated and trained in violence, there is a need to urgently address this issue to prevent the possibility of a new flare-up.

Those supporting the former view further point to the fact that the misuse of funds for ex-combatants is now a matter before the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA). Those supporting the latter view point to the street and political clout of those who have boycotted the second CA elections and their capacity to disrupt/derail the peace process should their ranks swell with the disgruntled ex-combatants.

*What can be inferred from this startling divergence in perception is that the issue is tied up with that of re-thinking the mandate and program of NPTF, especially as regards its being transformed into a strong unit of government (wherever it may be located) capable of pre-empting potential future flare-ups.*

Related with this point is that of the role of the NGAs and the need for continued dialogue as part of the peace process, on which matter a strong divergence of opinion was registered as well. Some forum, some recognized platform for dialogue is needed first to vent out grievances that may be lurking, germinating and growing under the carpet so to speak (grievances that are often not even acknowledged in public or official discourse let alone properly articulated) and then to crystallize and formalize them in a more official setting once the broad outline of the problem and the potential direction of their solutions have emerged. This is where many interviewees saw some role for the non-official actors and agencies; and it is understood that some preliminary explorations have been made by NPTF through a pilot program on this front.

*A simple summary conclusion on the role of NGAs was “Yes, but...” with many ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ that will have to be sorted out regarding the scope, arena, sector and modalities of NGA involvement with NPTF as well as government rules and regulations that need to be strengthened to address known weaknesses in government-civil society relations.*

## Annex 1: List of the Respondents

Category	S. N.	Name of Individuals	Date of Interview	Designation	Organization	Remarks
MOPR including LPC secretaries	1	Bharat Acharya	9th March 2014	Under Secretary	MOPR	In place of Secretary Mr. Dhan Bahadur Tamang
	2	Deependra Nath Sharma	10th March 2014	Joint Secretary	MOPR	
	3	Laxmi Kalauni	10th March 2014	Under Secretary, M&E Officer, PFS	MOPR	In place of Sadhu Ram Sapkota
	4	Laxmi Basnet	11th March 2014	Joint Secretary	MOPR	
	5	Laxmi Sharan Ghimire	10th March 2014	Joint Secretary	MOPR	
	6	Binod K. C	9th March 2014	Joint Secretary	MOPR	
	7	Binod Acharya	11th March 2014	Project Management Officer, PFS	MOPR	
	8	Laxmi Rijal	3rd March 2014	LPC Secretary, Kathmandu	MOPR	
	9	Yamuna Khanal	7th March 2014	LPC Secretary, Bhaktapur	MOPR	
	10	Durga Nidhi Sharma	18th March 2014	Former PFS Director	MOPR	
IAs of NPTF	11	Ram Chandra Dahal	6th March 2014	Program Officer	NDF	Added as per lateral list of respondents
	12	Maheswor Neupane	21st March 2014	Joint Secretary	ECN	
	13	Ramesh Dhakal	23rd March 2014	Joint Secretary	OPMC	
	14	Shambhu Ghimire	6th March 2014	Joint Secretary	MoHA	
	15	Gaj Bahadur Rana	4th March 2014	Under Secretary	MoWCSW	
	16	Shree Bhadra Wagle	5th March 2014	Executive Director	Radio Nepal	
	17	Rajendra Misra	4th March 2014	Under Secretary	Mol	
	18	Prem Bhattra	13th March 2014	Under Secretary	MOE	
	19	Krishna P Guragain	3rd March 2014	SSP	Nepal Police	
	20	Neel Kantha Uprety	9th March 2014	Chief Commissioner	ECN	
	21	Shyam Babu Kafle	11th March 2014	Human Right officer	NHRC	In place of Bed Prasad Bhattarai
	22	Puroshottam Nepal	19th March 2014	Under Secretary	Secretary, MOFALD	In place of Shanta Bd Shrestha
Former Chief	23	Madhav Pd Ghimire	19th March 2014	Former Chief Secretary	GON	

Secretaries-2, Secretaries of MOPR – 4 and PFS Directors- 4,	24	Dhurba Sharma	23rd March 2014	Former Secretary	MOPR	
	25	Punya Prasad Neupane	7th March 2014	Former Secretary	MOPR	
	26	Vidhayadhar Mallik	2nd March 2014	Former Secretary	MOPR	
	27	Khum Raj Punjali	19th March 2014	Former PFS Director	MOPR	
	28	Surya Silwal	20th March 2014	Former PFS Director	MOPR	
	29	Sharada Pd Trital	13th March 2014	Former PFs Director	Office of the President	
Former Ministers and Board of NPTF	30	Pampha Bhusal	18th March 2014	Former Minister, MOPR	CPN-M	
	31	Satya Pahadi	3rd March	Former Minister, MOPR	UCPNM	
	32	Ram Chandra Poudel	20th March 2014	Former Minister	NC	
	33	Dr. Shivaji Yadav	5th March 2014	Former Board Member		
	34	Bhim Rawal	19th March 2014	Former Board Member	CPN UML	
Senior Civil Servant from Government Organizations	35	Krishna Hari Baskota	12th March 2014	Secretary	OPMCM	
	36	Shankar Prasad Koirala	14th March 2014	Joint Secretary	Ministry of Home Affairs	
	37	Narayan Dhakal	18th March 2014	Under Secretary	Ministry of Finance	In place of Mr. Madhu Marasaini,/
	38	Chiranjivi Timsina	4th March	Under Secretary	National Dalit Commission	
	39	High officials	5th March		National Women Commision	
	40	Bhesh Raj Sharma	17th March 2014	Secretary	MOLJ	
	41	High Official	28th March 2014		MOF	
	42	Janardan Nepal	14th March 2014	Secretary	Ministry of Home Affairs	
Media and Journalists	43	Kanak Mani Dixit	18th March 2014	Journalist	Himal Khabar Patrika	
	44	Phadindra Dahal	31st March 2014	Journalist	BBC	
	45	Yub Raj Ghimire	5th March 2014	Journalist	Seto Pati	
	46	Saroj Raj Adhikari	20th March 2014	Deputy News Coordinator	Kantipur	

Donor s contributing to NPTF	47	Anine Hagemann	17th March 2014	First Secretary	Denmark	
	48	Mie Resdahl	26th March 2014	Senior advisor on conflict transformation and human rights with EoD and Danida HUGOU – donor coordinator on cluster 3 and participant in the TC pool SC	Denmark	
	49	Shiva Bhandari	10th March 2014	Donor representatives	European Union	
	50	Bhola Dahal and Kristina Revheim	19th March 2014	Donor representatives	Norway	
	51	Maryenne Kujala Gracia	12th March 2014	Counsellor (Development)	Finland	
	52	Jacqueline Groth	7h March	Head of the Economic and Development Co-operation Division	Germany	
	53	Martin Sturzinger accompanied by Tania Hoerler Perrinet and Pia Lignell	11th March 2014	Senior Adviser, Directorate of Political Affairs DP	Switzerland	
	54	Edward Bell	14th March 2014	Peacebuilding Advisor	UK	
Politicians	55	Surendra Pandey	12th March 2014	Former Finance Minister	CPN (UML)	
	56	Chitra Lekha Yadav	21st March 2014	Leader	NC	
	57	Kamal Thapa	26th March 2014	Chairperson	RPPN	
	58	Chandra Bdr. Gurung	26th March 2014	Leader	RPPN	
	59	Sunil Ranjan Singh	28th March 2014	Chief of the Legal Department	MJF (D)	
	60	Janardan Sharma 'Prabhakar"	24th March 2014	Leader	UCPN (M)	
	61	Bharat Mohan Adhikari	15th Saturday 2014	Former Finance Minister	CPN UML	
	62	Shakti Basnet	13th March 2014	Former Board Member	UCPN (M)	

Other International Actors involved in peacebuilding	63	Sarada Gyawali	6th March 2014	Consultant	ADB	
	64	Silla Ristimaki	6th March 2014	Program Specialist	UNFPN	
	65	Dominic de Ville	13th March 2014	Country Director for Peacebuilding	International Alert	
	66	Ojaswi Shah	7th March 2014	Project Officer	Saferworld	
	67	Dr. Sagar Prasai	13th March 2014	Deputy Country Representative	The Asia Foundation	
	68	Takakiyo Koizumi	6th March 2014	Project Formulation Advisor	JICA	
	69	Ashutosh Tiwari	10th March	Country Director	Water Aid	
	70	Elena Maria Barron	14th March 2014	Director, Democracy and Governance Office	USAID	
Civil Society Members	71	Rajan Parajuli	5th March 2014	Program Director	Antenna Foundation	
	72	Dilli Bahadur Chaudhary	14th March 2014	President	BASE	
	73	Upendra Aryal	3rd March 2014	Executive Director	Equal Access Nepal	
	74	Dhanapati Dhungel	6th March 2014	President	FAYA Nepal	
	75	Suresh Acharya	11th March 2014	President	MIREST Nepal	
	76	Prakash Mani Sharma	4th March	Executive Director	Pro Public	
	77	Prabin Manandhar	4th March	Executive Director	RRN	
	78	Sharmila Karki	5th March	President	NGO Federation	
	79	Bandana Rana	7th March 2014	Chairperson	1325 Action Group	
	80	Gajadhar Sunar	11th March 2014	Chairperson	Dalit NGO Federation	
	81	Nagendra Kumar Kumal	4th March	Chairman	NEFIN	
Total	81					

## Annex 2: List of Researchers from Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA)

<b>S.No.</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation</b>
1.	Dr. Sudhindra Sharma	Team Leader
2.	Mr. Dipak Gyawali	Senior Researcher/Advisor
3.	Mr. Chiranjibi Bhandari	Researcher
4.	Mr. Rajib Timalisina	Researcher
5.	Mr. Pranab Kharel	Researcher
6.	Mr. Bijay Raj Pant	Researcher
7.	Ms. Shuvechha Ghimire	Researcher
8.	Ms. Deelasha Rayamajhi	Researcher
9.	Mr. Arjun Bahadur B.K.	Researcher
10.	Mr. Shashwat Acharya	Researcher
11.	Mr. Ratna Dahal	Researcher
12.	Mr. Chandra K.C.	Data Analyst
13.	Mr. Pranaya Sthapit	Data Analyst

### Annex 3: Brief Timeline of Activities Undertaken

S/N	Major Events	Activities	Date	Remarks
1	Contract Sign	Between GIZ and IDA	24 <sup>th</sup> Feb 2014	
2	Meeting between GIZ team and IDA Research Team	GIZ and IDA, and discussion on TOR, revision of questionnaire, possible resource person, addition of respondents	24 <sup>th</sup> Feb 2014	
3	Orientation on NPTF Perception Survey among IDA Team Members	Reading of questionnaire, discussion for clarification, and division of assignment	26 <sup>th</sup> Feb 2014	
4	Translation of Questionnaire	From English to Nepali	27 <sup>th</sup> feb-2 <sup>nd</sup> March 2014	
5	Meeting of Research Team	Distribution of timesheet, letter, circulation of tentative list of respondents, technical proposal,	28 <sup>th</sup> Feb 2014	
5	Administration of Questionnaire	Administration of both English and Nepali Questionnaire	2 <sup>nd</sup> March 2014 onwards	
6	Research Team Regular Meeting	Meeting for Progress report	5 <sup>th</sup> March 2014	
7	Research Team Meeting	For making strategy	11 <sup>th</sup> March 2014	
8	Research Team Meeting		15 <sup>th</sup> March 2014	
9	Data Entry		18 <sup>th</sup> March 2014 onwards	
10	Analysis of data for the first draft		21 <sup>st</sup> March 2014 onwards	
11.	Draft report preparation		23 <sup>rd</sup> March 2014	70 interviews incorporated in first draft report
12.	Workshop on Hotel Himalaya	Presentation of preliminary findings of the perception survey, and group work on workshop	28 <sup>th</sup> March 2014	
12	Cutoff date for the last interview		1 <sup>st</sup> April 2014	81 interviews completed
13	Data processing and report preparation		2 <sup>nd</sup> April to 9 <sup>th</sup> April 2014	
14	Submission of Draft Report	To GIZ-NPTF	10 <sup>th</sup> April 2014	
15	Submission of Final Report	To GIZ-NPTF	21 <sup>st</sup> April 2014	

Annex 4: Workshop Proceedings  
Workshop on NPTF Perception Survey 2014

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Date: 28<sup>th</sup> March 2014  
Time: 2.00 pm-6.30 pm  
Location: Hotel Himalaya  
Number of Participants: 5

Facilitation by Christoph Feyen

The workshop commenced with the welcome remarks of Deependra Nath Sharma, Joint Secretary at Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) who also chairs the Task Force on NPTF Strategy Development.

Mr. Sharma welcomed distinguished guest from different stakeholders such as donor groups, implementing agencies, researchers and other international agencies. During his speech, he recalled some of the outstanding tasks accomplished by NPTF, and referred to it as a 'unique vehicle' for funding mechanism for carrying out historic task of rehabilitation and integration of the ex-combatants along with supporting the election of Constituent Assembly twice. He further mentioned in his introductory speech that after seven years of functioning, the fate of the NPTF has met a turning point because it has become imperative to reengineer the organization by revisiting and revising the strategies that NPTF currently holds. He also mentioned that this tasks demands critical and constructive engagement among the stakeholders.

The facilitator, Christoph Feyen, highlighted the major objectives of the workshop.

1. To identify the key issues to be taken into account with regards to various fields.
2. However, the workshop was not the forum for taking decisions.

He then asked Dr. Sudhindra Sharma, the Executive Director of Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA) and team leader of the perception survey to present its preliminary findings.

Dr. Sudhindra Sharma made a presentation on quantitative findings of the perception survey report. The team leader's presentation was followed by that of Dipak Gyawali, Chairman of IDA who was involved as a senior researcher in the perception survey. His presentation centered around the qualitative portion of the research in which he addressed the open ended questions previously not covered in the quantitative presentation.

Based on empirical findings of the data Dr. Sharma put forward a preliminary finding on the issues of past and future of NPTF. The formers were for instances the level of changes respondents observed during the last years, NPTF's contribution in peace process, and its rating and assessment; whereas, the later ones are need of NPTF after 2016, areas of priorities, its extension as it is or any changes in terms of mandates, its affiliation with any other organization, and open up to NGAs. The finding of the survey is that majority of stakeholders are of the view that NPTF should be extended within MOPR, since some of the major tasks of peace process have not been accomplished. Further, the result of the survey suggests that majority of respondents are for changes in terms of mandate, specified priority areas, and opened up to the NGOs.

Questions raised after presentation: One of the participants (Chandra Bahadur Gurung from RPP Nepal) raised the question on how IDA could assess from its finding that the peace process has been completed when a large number of works are yet to be completed. Other participants raised the question on the respondent's understanding of NPTF (like the rationale, objectives, budget and the likes); Pradip Gyawali, a prominent CPN-UML former Minister questioned the respondent's understanding of NPTF's transformation if it is to be extended after 2016 January.

After a tea break the participants were divided into four working groups. The groups were based on the thematic priority areas of the survey. The first working group was assigned to review NPTF mandate and thematic areas—The second working group's task was based on the finding that a majority of stakeholders (around 73%) were against the extension of NPTF as it is. Therefore this group had to review the tasks which were deemed important in order to respond to the need for change. The third working group was assigned to review the pros and cons of NPTF within MoPR and outside MOPR. The fourth working group was assigned the task of reviewing the areas within NPTF that could be opened to NGAs.

The first working group which was entrusted with the responsibility to revisit the Mandate of NPTF discussed all the points at length. The group agreed that the Mandate to structure itself as funding mechanism should continue. However agreements could not be reached on the other mandates. For instance 'coordination' was perceived as important but it was not clear at what level the coordination should take place. While some participants felt that coordination should be inter-ministerial others felt it should be at a much higher level. It was argued that going at higher level would lead NPTF stepping into the mandate of MoPR. Similarly discussions also revolved around the mandate 'monitoring the peace process'. A lot was discussed on this mandate but there was no agreement on this either. While most of the participants felt it is important and that monitoring is currently taking place at a much lower level which only focuses at the project level. There were discussions on whether NPTF can be given the Mandate

to Monitor the Peace Process visa-vis the MoPR. (For further details see the presentation of working group 1 in page 46-47.)

The second group made a list of various activities for assuring changes in various areas. On steering, they emphasize on the need of full time NPTF Director with strong leadership, identification of strategic areas and constant engagement by GON. Likewise, they suggested, regarding on the areas of personnel, that TA team be reduced in relation to GON staff; a-priori decision by GON and DG necessary on role of TA, and staff capacity must be established in relation to bigger programs. While talking on the areas of monitoring/ result orientation, they highlighted on the capacity enhancement of IAs so as to monitor, report and evaluate the programs. Finally, they also made suggestions to revise TAE reporting template, disbursement on the base of progress, need of government and donors' agreement on pooling fund, and phasing out and phasing in of previous/new portfolio respectively. However, the group said that they had somewhat in confusion on the area of communication since what sorts of communication, and with whom does it refer to the communication with IAs and 3<sup>rd</sup> Parties

The third group listed out the pros and cons of NPTF within and outside of MOPR. The pro of NPTF being within MOPR were: In case of NPTF extension for only 5 more years, it is better to position it within MoPR, also because both MoPR and NPTF has common objectives, i.e. implementation of Comprehensive Peace Accord. It was also highlighted by the officials of GoN that MoPR is not a temporary Ministry and has been already providing peace related dialogues; The lessons learned from NPTF positioned within MoF was that other such Ministries have other priorities and mandate than peace and therefore NPTF may not function well in these Ministries. If there is a need for transforming or closing down the NPTF structure, many discussants opined that all the achievements and knowledge gained by NPTF should be extended in one form or the other. A few discussants expressed the view to establish a peace research institute after the transformation and/or closure of NPTF to share the experiences and lessons learned by NPTF. The cons listed were: NPTF is understaffed, and MoPR is perceived as a weaker Ministry. The pros the NPTF being outside of MOPR: it can function better with other powerful Ministry, go for a broader mandate in long term vision; and cons: MoPR is at risk of losing its core institution in the form of NPTF.

The fourth group discussed the potential role of civil society in regard to NPTF. The group initially discussed the definition of civil society and NGAs, i.e. whether what is referred to hereunder are primarily national NGOs or whether it also includes community based organization, academia etc. Furthermore, it was discussed that an involvement of NGA into NPTF should be based on a clearly defined mandate. There was broad agreement during the discussion that a comparative advantage of NGA lies in their network and outreach on the local

level which represents a significant added value if NGA are included into NPTF. It was stressed, though, that if NGA should be involved under the NPTF umbrella, there should be a clear demarcation between implementing projects and involvement in M&E, i.e. NGAs cannot be involved in monitoring of their own projects. When it came to whether or not NGA should be involved in decision making of NPTF (i.e. beyond the current two representatives in the Technical Committee) some participants were not in favor to extend the role of civil society stressing that NPTF is a GoN led initiative and therefore should not include NGAs in decision making. Other participants underlined that if an (increased) involvement in decision making should take place, it would need to be on the basis of their expertise and competence related to the matter at hand. Participants widely agreed that the further decision on whether or not to include NGA in NPTF in the future would also to a large extent depend on the results, experiences and lessons learnt during the ongoing Pilot Initiative “Peace Fund for NGA”.

Presentations were made by the four working groups. Some groups had quite a clear mandate on issues and themes, while some other groups agreed to disagree. Nonetheless, it brought about an open debate on the relevant issues that will be addressed in the days to come.

After the working group’s presentation, Christoph called on Sadhram Sapkota, PFS Director/Joint Secretary to say a few words on the issues raised during the group discussions. Mr. Sapkota mentioned in his speech that there was confusion at different levels and that until we come to a conclusion, the NPTF strategy should be harmonized with that of MOPR. He appreciated IDA’s work which was done under intense pressure. And he was grateful for the good ideas that had garnered out of survey which helped facilitate working groups’ session. He also mentioned that the findings of the survey will be forwarded to the higher levels in NPTF and to the relevant government bodies.

Donor's Chair Ambassador, Mrs. Rensje Teerink from EU said that it was an important discussion between stakeholders. It is a milestone that will contribute to peace process. However she mentioned that the areas discussed needs further discussions and analysis. She appreciated the government and other stakeholders for taking the issues openly for the debate.

Secretary of MoPR, Dhan Bahadur Tamang, said that the issue was overall a very complicated one with much confusion since NPTF is at turning point. He commended the Perception Survey for helping clarify issues and mentioned that the report’s presentation of issues came very close to his own observations and perception. All the perceptions of the stakeholders are equally important; and as the nation is preparing for the planning of budget the workshop is in right time. He also emphasized that except the management of cantonments and rehabilitation of Maoists combatants, other areas of NPTF's involvement are still relevant to accomplish the

objectives of the CPA. Therefore, the investment of NPTF to present areas should not be curtailed.

**List of Participants in the Workshop on NPTF Survey Findings  
Hotel Himalaya, March 28, 2014 (Friday)**

<b>S. N.</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Designation</b>
1	Nanda Kumar Sharma	Eu/PFS	
2	Shyam Sundar Sharma	EU/PFS	
3	Pia Lignell	Swiss Embassy	
4	Deependra Nath Sharma	MoPR	Joint Secretary of MOPR
5	Arvinda Kumar Rimal	PFS	M & E Officer, EU
6	Dhan Bd. Tamang	MoPR	Secretary, MOPR
7	Binod Prasad Acharya	MoPR	Joint Secretary of MOPR
8	Prakash Pyakurel	PFS	
9	Kulchandra Parajuli	NPTF	Computer Operator, NPTF
10	J.M Goldriuk	UN	
11	Lach Fergusson	UNPFN	Coordinator
12	Liss Herlen	Swiss Embassy	
13	Chandra Bahadur Gurung	RPP - N	General Secretary, RPP(N)
14	T. Thomsen	PFS/EU	
15	Bhojraj Pokharel	EU/NPTF	Former Election Commissioner
16	Sadhuram Sapkota	NPTF	PFS Director/ Joint Secretary MoPR
17	Binod K.C	MoPR	Joint Secretary of MoPR
18	Indra Gurung	Finland Embassy	
19	Pradip Gyawali	CPN (UML)	UML Leader, Board Member, NPTF
20	Shiva Bhandari	EU	
21	Dr. Narayan Tiwari	NPTF	
22	Er.K.P Guragain	Police HQ	SSP, Nepal Police
23	FMO Til Bdr. Thapa Magar	PFS	
24	Steuxe Polaucl	GIZ	
25	Jacqueline Groth	German Embassy	
26	Benjamin Konstanzer	GIZ/PFS	
27	Reider	Swiss Embassy	
28	Santosh Bisht	NPTF/GIZ	Senior Programme Officer
29	Sunil Ranjan Sigh	Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (Democratic)	Board Member/ NPTF
30	Sharada Gyawali	ADB	Consultant
31	G.B Dorgi	MOPR	
32	Roshani Adhikari	NPTF/EU	
33	Edward Bell	DFID	
34	Anine Hageman	Danish Embassy	First Secretary
35	Laxmi Basnet	MOPR	Joint Secretary of MoPR
36	Munni Sharma	PFS	GESI Officer, USAID/ NPTF

37	Januka Kafle	PFS	
38	Bala Nanda Sharma	Secretariat of SC	Former Coordinator at Secretariat of Special Committee
39	Dipendra Purush Dhakal	NPTF	Coordinator, Technical Committee, NPTF
40	Manju Lama	Embassy Denmark	
41	Barsha Pradhan	NPTF/GIZ	
42	Murali Dhar Tiwari	NPTF	
43	Morten Dall	Embassy Denmark	
43	Apekchya Rana	NPTF/EU	
44	Nita Pachhai	DFID	Coordinator- Donor agencies
45	Pekka Seppala	Finland Embassy	Deputy Chief of Mission
46	Krishna Pd. Sharma	Civil Society	
47	Yadav Pd. Koirala	Home Ministry	
48	Kristina	Embassy Norway	
49	Surya Silwal	OPMCM	Former PFS Director; Current Secretary Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers
50	Bigyan Sharma	Nepal Police	
51	Christoph Feyen		Facilitator
52	Janardan Sharma Prabhakar	UCPNM	Leader and Former Minister of MOPR



## Working Group 1

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The first working group was entrusted with the responsibility to revisit the Mandate of NPTF. The group agreed that the Mandate to of a funding mechanism should continue. However agreements could not be reached on the other mandates. For instance 'coordination' was perceived as important but it was not clear at what level the coordination should take place. While some participants felt that coordination should be inter-ministerial and others felt it should be at a much higher level. It was discussed that coordination at a higher level might be perceived as NPTF stepping into the Mandate of MoPR. Similarly discussions also prevailed around the mandate 'monitoring the peace process'. A lot was discussed on this mandate but there was no agreement on this either. While most of the participants felt it was important, there was again confusion on the level of monitoring and that monitoring is currently taking place but at a much lower level which only focuses at the project level. There were discussions on whether NPTF can be given the Mandate to Monitor the Peace Process visa-vis the MoPR.

The group working alongside the proposed thematic areas also dwelled into the topic of NPTFs mandate. The three mandates (coordinating body for peace, funding mechanism and monitoring the peace process) according the current program documents were discussed. The group came up with a few subjective ideas like increasing the funding mechanisms by more political engagement and by monitoring the peace process though at what level it should be monitored remained contested. Similarly, they also mentioned coordinating peace dialogue at local and national level and coordinating strategies and policies. Furthermore they mentioned that they could monitor the peace process well by focusing the mandate on key objectives only and by taking a lead on peace related activities.

## Review of NPTF Mandate and Thematic Areas



## Working Group: 2


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The second group was assigned to make a discussion on the issues how to assure changes in various areas as the respondents of the survey were against extension as it is. The first area was steering, in which they emphasized on the need of full time director with strong leadership, identification of strategic areas and constant engagement by GON. The second area was personnel, in which they have suggested that TA team to be reduced in relation to GON staff; a-priori decision by GON and DG necessary on role of TA, and the need of staff capacity enhancement in relation to bigger programs. While talking on the areas of monitoring/ result orientation, they highlighted on the capacity enhancement of IAs, they have implication on result oriented monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the programs. Finally, they also made suggestions to revise TAE reporting template, disbursement on the base of progress, need of government and donors' agreement on pooling fund, and phasing in and phasing out of previous/new portfolio. However, the group said that they had somewhat in confusion on the area of communication since what sorts of communication, and with whom does it refer to the communication with IAs and 3<sup>rd</sup> parties.

WG2: NPTF within the Present setting

73% are against extension as it as

What has to happen to respond to the wish for change?



**NPTF within MoPR or outside MoPR**

	<b>Within MoPR</b>	<b>Outside MoPR</b>
<b>PRO</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. If NPTF is to be extended less than 5 years after its mandate ends on January 2016</li> <li>2. CPA is the responsibility of NPTF as well as MoPR</li> <li>3. Previously NPTF was placed under Ministry of Finance (MoF) where it could not perform very well. Comparatively having places it under MoPR, NPTF has had a substantial improvement in its functioning and tasks.</li> <li>4. Peace is specific phenomena dealt exclusively by NPTF to a large extent therefore NPTF should exist within the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction.</li> <li>5. It can reach out to multiple implementers. The ministries are overloaded with work. Moreover specific ministries look after specific tasks and hence one cannot guarantee the place of NPTF on other ministries like MoF, OPMCM or MoFALD.</li> <li>6. MoPR is not a temporary ministry.</li> <li>7. MoPR has been providing forum for dialogue.</li> <li>8. The projects can be implemented through government organizations.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. It could help strengthen line ministries.</li> <li>2. There are other ministries more powerful and may not be accountable to MoPR.</li> <li>3. It could allow for a longer term vision. For example like, Nepal Peace Justice.</li> <li>4. If NPTF is to exist outside MoPR it can help on a long term peace perspective.</li> <li>5. If NPTF is made autonomous, the project implementation could be given to various NGAs.</li> </ol>
<b>CON</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. NPTF is under staffed for administering funds and projects.</li> <li>2. MoPR is perceived as a weak ministry (staffing, hierarchy, new ministry).</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. It risks the existence of MoPR.</li> </ol>

The third group listed out the pros and cons of NPTF within and outside of MOPR. The pro of NPTF being within MOPR were: The functioning of NPTF has improved under MoPR compared to then when it was under MOF. It was also highlighted by the officials of GoN that MoPR is not a temporary Ministry. Moreover NPTF has been providing peace related dialogues and has been a platform of pull-fund for peace related activities. Hence, in order for it to function, one group echoed the voice that it should be kept under the MoPR.


The cons listed were: NPTF is understaffed, there is only a provision of a part time director and there are insufficient personnel with required skills and training. Lastly, an echoing voice mentioned that while NPTF had successfully completed cluster 1 and a few more projects, it had not yet concentrated on the issues pertaining to Transitional Justice (which during the survey finding came up as a vita task to be concentrated on).

The pros of NPTF being outside of MOPR was that it would be affiliated to a ministry more powerful than that of MoPR and that it would promote a long term vision of peace building in Nepal.

The discussants were not sure of the continuation of the NPTF structure for the long run. But most of them agree on spreading the knowledge and achievements gained by NPTF in one form or the other. If there is a need for transforming or closing down the NPTF structure, many discussants opined that all the achievements and knowledge gained by NPTF should be extended, for example by establishing a peace research institute to spread the lessons learned by NPTF.

### Role of Civil Society within NPTF

What could/should be the areas of more involvement of civil societies?



How?


Why?

If the mandate allows

- Audit procedure
- Political intervention
- Lack of faith
- Code of conduct

YES! BUT ...

- There should be institutional changes
- There should be a clear mandate
- There should be an agency setting
- There should be transparency
- There should be NGA's outreach
- Expertise
- Intervention
- Presence/ impact



The fourth group came up with the list of ideas on both, for and against the role of civil society in NPTF. The group said that there should be clarity about the definition of roles of civil society and NGAs. They also mentioned that the participation should be made clear from a well written mandate; they mentioned that NGA's could play a supporting role to the GoN as NGAs have a local level connection and a broader outreach. On other hand, people opposing to opening up the project implementation to NGAs mentioned that NPTF is a government initiative and thus should not include NGAs in decision making. They also pointed out that it is important to identify NGAs on the basis of their competence. People who supported the role of NGAs within NPTF conditioned that there should be clear demarcation between implementing NGAs and monitoring & evaluation NGAs.